International Relations

Taught: Winter 2023

Course information

• Juan Tellez (pronounced: “Teh-yes”)

• jftellez@ucdavis.edu

• Tuesdays, 3:10 PM - 6:00 PM

• Kerr Hall 593

• Office Hours

Course description

This course is a graduate-level introduction to the field of international relations (IR), focusing on core theoretical and empirical debates in the literature. Readings are a mix of old and new, leaning towards newer work.

The primary goal of this course is to for students to develop a sense for where the literature has been and where it is going. As students move forward with their studies, this course will help students develop a fuller sense of the context in which other work they read is situated.

Course policies

Late proposals, papers, etc. will be penalized by a letter grade per day, up to two days, then it’s a zero.

Assignments

Participation (5% of grade)

To receive full credit you must:

1. come to class having read

2. be engaged in discussion

Discussion questions (DQs; 10% of grade)

Eeach week you will post one bullet point discussion question/comment per reading to Canvas. The questions/comments need to be good. A good discussion question offers a specific critique, is thought-provoking, generates discussion among the group, etc. A not-good discussion question is above all generic – it is not specific to the reading and leaves the group without guidance on where to take the discussion.

⭐ Due dates: Sunday by midnight before each class

Peer-review (30% of grade)

You will write two mock “peer-reviews” in the spirit of working as a reviewer for a journal. Your review should eschew summary in favor of critically evaluating the paper (a great guide here). The goal is to make a recommendation to an editor (me) as to whether or not the paper should be published. If your recommendation is to “revise and resubmit” assume that implies a high probability of publication. The review should be between 500 and 800 words in length.

Due dates:

• Review 1 due by February 3rd, 2023 ⭐
• Review 2 due by March 3rd, 2023 ⭐

Choose two from the following:

• The Dirty-Work Hypothesis

• Perspective Taking and Security Dilemma Thinking: Experimental Evidence from China and the United States

• The Impact of China’s AIIB on the World Bank

• Losing on the Home Front? Battlefield Casualties, Media, and Public Support for Foreign Interventions

• Why Rich Countries Win Investment Disputes

Dataset presentation (25% of grade)

Instructions

The goal of this assignment is to become acquainted with an important data collection effort in our field. You will download the data, clean it as needed, learn its ins and outs, and produce some compelling visuals. You will then present on the dataset to the class for ~ 10 minutes. Points to hit in the presentation:

• What does an observation look like in this data? What is being measured? How do the authors get from raw text to the final product? (~ 1 slide)
• You will create and discuss two interesting visualizations from this dataset; could be time series, bivariate relationship, conditional means, a table, etc. (2 slides)
• Strengths and weaknesses – what is good and exciting about this project? What kinds of questions could we answer with this data? What are the limitations (temporal, spatial, conceptual)? (~ 1-2 slides)

See Data sets for a list of ideas. Below are also some good templates for making interesting visualizations of datasets:

• Analysis of the bible
• Analysis of baby names
• Speed dating experiment

Submission

You will work in pairs and submit jointly (sign up sheet in class). Two outputs: an R script with the code used to make visuals/tables + the presentation. Each pair of students will email me these shortly after their presentation.

Research proposal (30%)

6 pages. See the rubric. You should meet with me to talk through your idea, sooner rather than later.

⭐ Due by March 21, 2023.

Schedule

Note: the schedule is subject to change.

Week 1 – Jan 10 : What does good research in IR look like? Theory, causality, prediction

Required

• Cyrus Samii, “Causal Empiricism in Quantitative Research,” The Journal of Politics 78, no. 3 (2016): 941–955.
• John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “Leaving Theory Behind: Why Simplistic Hypothesis Testing Is Bad for International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 3 (2013): 427–457.
• Michael D. Ward, Brian D. Greenhill, and Kristin M. Bakke, “The Perils of Policy by p-Value: Predicting Civil Conflicts,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 4 (2010): 363–375.
• Luke Keele, “The Statistics of Causal Inference: A View from Political Methodology,” Political Analysis 23, no. 3 (2015): 313–335. Focus on Section 3.
• Susan D. Hyde, “Experiments in International Relations: Lab, Survey, and Field,” Annual Review of Political Science 18 (2015): 403–424.

Recommended

• Stathis Kalyvas and Scott Straus, “Stathis Kalyvas on 20 Years of Studying Political Violence,” Violence: An International Journal 1, no. 2 (2020): 389–407.
• John Gerring, “Mere Description,” British Journal of Political Science 42, no. 4 (2012): 721–746.
• Jacob M. Montgomery, Brendan Nyhan, and Michelle Torres, “How Conditioning on Posttreatment Variables Can Ruin Your Experiment and What to Do about It,” American Journal of Political Science 62, no. 3 (2018): 760–775.
• Luke Keele, Randolph T. Stevenson, and Felix Elwert, “The Causal Interpretation of Estimated Associations in Regression Models,” Political Science Research and Methods 8, no. 1 (2020): 1–13.
• Jacob Westfall and Tal Yarkoni, “Statistically Controlling for Confounding Constructs Is Harder Than You Think,” PloS One 11, no. 3 (2016): e0152719.
• Scott F. Abramson, Korhan Koçak, and Asya Magazinnik, “What Do We Learn about Voter Preferences from Conjoint Experiments” (2022).
• Ethan Bueno De Mesquita and Scott A. Tyson, “The Commensurability Problem: Conceptual Difficulties in Estimating the Effect of Behavior on Behavior,” American Political Science Review 114, no. 2 (2020): 375–391.
• Carlos Cinelli, Andrew Forney, and Judea Pearl, “A Crash Course in Good and Bad Controls,” Sociological Methods & Research (2021): 00491241221099552.
• Thomas B. Pepinsky, “A Note on Listwise Deletion Versus Multiple Imputation,” Political Analysis 26, no. 4 (2018): 480–488.
• Guido W. Imbens, “Better LATE Than Nothing: Some Comments on Deaton (2009) and Heckman and Urzua (2009),” Journal of Economic Literature 48, no. 2 (2010): 399–423.
• Maya Sen and Omar Wasow, “Race as a Bundle of Sticks: Designs That Estimate Effects of Seemingly Immutable Characteristics,” Annual Review of Political Science 19 (2016): 499–522.
• Donald B. Rubin, “Statistics and Causal Inference: Comment: Which Ifs Have Causal Answers,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 81, no. 396 (1986): 961–962.
• Kenneth A. Bollen and Judea Pearl, “Eight Myths about Causality and Structural Equation Models,” Handbook of Causal Analysis for Social Research (2013): 301–328.

Week 2 – Jan 17 : What are the fundamental characteristics of the international system? Cooperation and conflict under anarchy

Required

• Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” World Politics 38, no. 1 (1985): 226–254.
• Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 391–425.
• Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887–917.
• Daniel H. Nexon, “The Balance of Power in the Balance,” World Politics 61, no. 2 (2009): 330–359.
• Laura Sjoberg, “Gender, Structure, and War: What Waltz Couldn’t See,” International Theory 4, no. 1 (2012): 1–38.

Recommended

• Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 485–507.
• Joseph Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).
• David A. Lake and Robert Powell, “International Relations: A Strategic-Choice Approach,” in Strategic Choice and International Relations, ed. David A. Lake and Robert Powell (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 3–38.
• John A. Vasquez, “The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative Versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz’s Balancing Proposition,” American Political Science Review 91, no. 4 (1997): 899–912.
• David A. Lake, “Why ‘isms’ Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments to Understanding and Progress1,” International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 2 (2011): 465–480.
• Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 72–107.
• schweller:2004?

Week 3 – Jan 24 : Why war? Bargaining and information

Required

• James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 379–414.
• Robert Powell, “Stability and the Distribution of Power,” World Politics 48, no. 2 (1996): 239–267.
• Branislav L. Slantchev, “The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 4 (2003): 621–632.
• Robert J Carroll and Brenton Kenkel, “Prediction, Proxies, and Power,” American Journal of Political Science 63, no. 3 (2019): 577–593.
• James D. Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 1 (1997): 68–90.

Recommended

• Austin Carson and Keren Yarhi-Milo, “Covert Communication: The Intelligibility and Credibility of Signaling in Secret,” Security Studies 26, no. 1 (2017): 124–156.
• Robert Powell, “Bargaining in the Shadow of Power,” World Politics 15, no. 2 (1996): 255–289.
• Robert Powell, “Bargaining Theory and International Conflict,” Annual Review Political Science 5 (2002): 1–30.
• Robert Powell, “The Inefficient Use of Power: Costly Conflict with Complete Information,” American Political Science Review 98, no. 2 (2004): 231–241.
• Robert Powell, “Bargaining and Learning while Fighting,” American Journal of Political Science 48, no. 2 (2004): 344–361.
• Robert Powell, “War as a commitment problem,” International Organization 60, no. 1 (2006): 169–203.
• Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd S. Sechser, “Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence,” American Journal of Political Science 58, no. 4 (2014): 919–935.
• James D. Fearon, “Cooperation, Conflict, and the Costs of Anarchy,” International Organization 72, no. 3 (2018): 523–559.

Week 4 – Jan 31 : How and when do states intervene in each other’s affairs? Third-party interventions

Required

• Virginia Page Fortna, “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War,” International Studies Quarterly 48 (2004): 269–292.
• Kyle Beardsley, “Agreement Without Peace? International Mediation and Time Inconsistency Problems,” American Journal of Political Science 52, no. 4 (2008): 723–740.
• I. Salehyan, K. S. Gleditsch, and D. Cunningham, “Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups,” International Organization 65, no. 4 (2011): 709–744.
• Nikolay Marinov, “Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?” American Journal of Political Science 49, no. 3 (2005): 564–576.
• Austin Carson, “Facing Off and Saving Face: Covert Intervention and Escalation Management in the Korean War,” International Organization 70, no. 1 (2016): 103–131.

Recommended

• Stephen E. Gent, “Going in When It Counts: Military Intervention and the Outcome of Civil Conflicts,” International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 4 (2008): 713–735.
• James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States,” International Security 28, no. 4 (2004): 5–43.
• Lindsey A. O’Rourke, “The Strategic Logic of Covert Regime Change: US Backed Regime Change Campaigns During the Cold War,” Security Studies 29, no. 1 (2020): 92–127.
• Robert A. Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work,” International Security 22, no. 2 (1997): 90–136.
• Jordan Roberts, “State Preferences, Viable Alternatives, and American Covert Action, 1946-1989,” Intelligence and National Security (2022): 1–24.
• John M. Owen, “The Foreign Imposition of Domestic Institutions,” International Organization 56, no. 2 (2002): 375–409.
• Navin A Bapat and Sean Zeigler, “Terrorism, Dynamic Commitment Problems, and Military Conflict,” American Journal of Political Science 60, no. 2 (2016): 337–351.
• Melissa M. Lee, “The International Politics of Incomplete Sovereignty: How Hostile Neighbors Weaken the State,” International Organization 72, no. 2 (2018): 283–315.

Week 5 – Feb 7 : How does national politics shape foreign policy? Domestic audiences and incentives for war

Required

• Ryan Brutger and Joshua D. Kertzer, “A Dispositional Theory of Reputation Costs,” International Organization 72, no. 3 (2018): 693–724.
• Alexandre Debs and Hein E. Goemans, “Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War,” American Political Science Review 104, no. 3 (2010): 430–445.
• Sarah E Croco, “The Decider’s Dilemma: Leader Culpability, War Outcomes, and Domestic Punishment,” American Political Science Review 105, no. 3 (2011): 457–477.
• Casey Crisman-Cox and Michael Gibilisco, “Audience Costs and the Dynamics of War and Peace,” American Journal of Political Science 62, no. 3 (2018): 566–580.
• Michael A. Goldfien, Michael F. Joseph, and Roseanne W. McManus, “The Domestic Sources of International Reputation,” American Political Science Review (2022): 1–20.

Recommended

• Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, “Domestic Explanations of International Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science 15 (2012): 161–181.
• James D. Fearon, “Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (1994): 236–269.
• Kenneth Schultz, “Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform?: Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War,” International Organization 52 (1999): 233–266.
• Kenneth Schultz, “Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises,” American Political Science Review 92 (1998): 829–844.
• Kenneth A. Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
• Jonathan Mercer, “Audience Costs Are Toys,” Security Studies 21, no. 3 (2012): 398–404.
• Branislav L. Slantchev, “Audience Cost Theory and Its Audiences,” Security Studies 21, no. 3 (2012): 376–382.
• Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 427–460.
• Marc Trachtenberg, “Audience Costs: An Historical Analysis,” Security Studies 21, no. 1 (2012): 3–42.
• Alexander B. Downes and Todd S. Sechser, “The Illusion of Democratic Credibility,” International Organization 66, no. 3 (2012): 457–489.
• Kenneth A. Schultz, “Why We Needed Audience Costs and What We Need Now,” Security Studies 21, no. 3 (2012): 369–375.
• Erik Gartzke and Yonatan Lupu, “Still Looking for Audience Costs,” Security Studies 21, no. 3 (2012): 391–397.

Week 7 – Feb 21 : How much do leaders matter? Leaders, autocrats, regimes

Required

• Jessica L. Weeks, “Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict,” American Political Science Review 106, no. 2 (2012): 326–347.
• Michael C. Horowitz and Allan C. Stam, “How Prior Military Experience Influences the Future Militarized Behavior of Leaders,” International Organization 68, no. 3 (2014): 527–559.
• Michaela Mattes and Mariana Rodrı́guez, “Autocracies and International Cooperation,” International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 3 (2014): 527–538.
• Michaela Mattes and Jessica LP Weeks, “Hawks, Doves, and Peace: An Experimental Approach,” American Journal of Political Science 63, no. 1 (2019): 53–66.
• Daniel Krcmaric, “Should i Stay or Should i Go? Leaders, Exile, and the Dilemmas of International Justice,” American Journal of Political Science 62, no. 2 (2018): 486–498.

Recommended

• Barbara Geddes, “Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirical Test of a Game Theoretic Argument” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1999).
• Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005).
• Bruce Bueno De Mesquita et al., “An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace,” American Political Science Review 93, no. 4 (1999): 791–807.
• Andrew Little and Anne Meng, “Subjective and Objective Measurement of Democratic Backsliding,” Available at SSRN 4327307 (2023).
• Kenneth A. Schultz, “The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves Deliver the Olive Branch?” International Organization 59, no. 1 (2005): 1–38.
• Roseanne W. McManus, “Crazy Like a Fox? Are Leaders with Reputations for Madness More Successful at International Coercion?” British Journal of Political Science 51, no. 1 (2021): 275–293.
• Keren Yarhi-Milo, Who Fights for Reputation: The Psychology of Leaders in International Conflict, vol. 156 (Princeton University Press, 2018).
• Little and Meng, “Subjective and Objective Measurement of Democratic Backsliding”.
• elpi:feaver:2002?

Week 8 – Feb 28 : Do interstate ties constrain state behavior? Networks

Required

• Timothy M. Peterson, “Dyadic Trade, Exit Costs, and Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 58, no. 4 (2014): 564–591.
• Brandon J. Kinne, “Network Dynamics and the Evolution of International Cooperation,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 4 (2013): 766–785.
• Kyle Beardsley et al., “Hierarchy and the Provision of Order in International Politics,” The Journal of Politics 82, no. 2 (2020): 731–746.
• Halvard Buhaug and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Contagion or Confusion? Why Conflicts Cluster in Space,” International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 2 (2008): 215–233.
• Zeev Maoz, “The Effects of Strategic and Economic Interdependence on International Conflict Across Levels of Analysis,” American Journal of Political Science 53, no. 1 (2009): 223–240.

Recommended

• Mark S. Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 6 (May 1973): 1360–1380.
• Brandon J. Kinne, “Multilateral Trade and Militarized Conflict: Centrality, Asymmetry, and Openness in the Global Trade Network,” The Journal of Politics 74, no. 1 (2012): 308–322.
• David A. Lake, “Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics,” International Security 32, no. 1 (2007): 47–79.
• Jesse Hammond, “Maps of Mayhem: Strategic Location and Deadly Violence in Civil War,” Journal of Peace Research 55, no. 1 (2018): 32–46.
• Mark J. C. Crescenzi, “Economic Exit, Interdependence, and Conflict,” The Journal of Politics 65, no. 3 (2003): 809–832.
• Stephen P. Borgatti et al., “Network Analysis in the Social Sciences,” Science 323, no. 5916 (2009): 892–895.
• G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William C. Wohlforth, International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity (Cambridge University Press, 2011).

Week 9 – Mar 7 : When do states cooperate? Agreements and IOs

Required

• Virginia Page Fortna, “Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace,” International Organization 57, no. 2 (2003): 337–372.
• Brett Ashley Leeds, Michaela Mattes, and Jeremy S. Vogel, “Interests, Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments,” American Journal of Political Science 53, no. 2 (2009): 461–476.
• Beth A. Kelley Judith G .and Simmons, “Politics by Number: Indicators as Social Pressure in International Relations,” American Journal of Political Science 59, no. 1 (2015): 55–70.
• Ilyana Kuziemko and Eric Werker, “How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations,” Journal of Political Economy 114, no. 5 (2006): 905–930.
• Phillip Y. Lipscy, “Explaining Institutional Change: Policy Areas, Outside Options, and the Bretton Woods Institutions,” American Journal of Political Science 59, no. 2 (2015): 341–356.

Recommended

• Allison Carnegie and Austin Carson, “The Disclosure Dilemma: Nuclear Intelligence and International Organizations,” American Journal of Political Science 63, no. 2 (2019): 269–285.
• Rush Doshi, Judith G. Kelley, and Beth A. Simmons, “The Power of Ranking: The Ease of Doing Business Indicator and Global Regulatory Behavior,” International Organization 73, no. 3 (2019): 611–643.
• Daniel Krcmaric, “Does the International Criminal Court Target the American Military?” American Political Science Review (2022): 1–7.
• George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, “Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?” International Organization 50, no. 3 (1996): 379–406.
• Peter Buisseret and Dan Bernhardt, “Reelection and Renegotiation: International Agreements in the Shadow of the Polls,” American Political Science Review 112, no. 4 (2018): 1016–1035.
• Erik Voeten, “Making Sense of the Design of International Institutions,” Annual Review of Political Science 22 (2019): 147–163.

Week 10 – Mar 14 : Borders, territory, migration

Required

• Scott F. Abramson and David B. Carter, “The Historical Origins of Territorial Disputes,” American Political Science Review 110, no. 4 (2016): 675–698.
• Beth A Simmons and Michael R. Kenwick, “Border Orientation in a Globalizing World,” American Journal of Political Science (2021).
• David B. Carter and Paul Poast, “Barriers to Trade: How Border Walls Affect Trade Relations,” International Organization 74, no. 1 (2020): 165–185.
• Paul K. Huth, Sarah E. Croco, and Benjamin J. Appel, “Bringing Law to the Table: Legal Claims, Focal Points, and the Settlement of Territorial Disputes Since 1945,” American Journal of Political Science 57, no. 1 (2013): 90–103.
• Yang-Yang Zhou and Andrew Shaver, “Reexamining the Effect of Refugees on Civil Conflict: A Global Subnational Analysis,” American Political Science Review 115, no. 4 (2021): 1175–1196.

Recommended

• Douglas M. Gibler and Jaroslav Tir, “Settled Borders and Regime Type: Democratic Transitions as Consequences of Peaceful Territorial Transfers,” American Journal of Political Science 54, no. 4 (2010): 951–968.
• Egon F. Kunz, “The Refugee in Flight: Kinetic Models and Forms of Displacement,” International Migration Review 7, no. 2 (1973): 125–146.
• S. D. Roper and L. a. Barria, “Burden Sharing in the Funding of the UNHCR: Refugee Protection as an Impure Public Good,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 54, no. 4 (2010): 616–637.
• Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Refugees and the Spread of Civil War,” International Organization 60, no. 2 (2007): 335–366.
• Fiona B. Adamson, “Crossing Borders: International Migration and National Security,” International Security 31, no. 1 (2006): 165–199.
• Devesh Kapur, “Political Effects of International Migration,” Annual Review of Political Science 17 (2014): 479–502.
• Christina Davenport, Will Moore, and Steven Poe, “Sometimes You Just Have to Leave: Domestic Threats and Forced Migration, 1964-1989,” International Interactions 29, no. 1 (2003): 27–55.
• Christian Breunig, Xun Cao, and Adam Luedtke, “Global Migration and Political Regime Type: A Democratic Disadvantage,” British Journal of Political Science 42, no. 4 (2012): 825–854.

Extra stuff, no room

Reputation

• Allison Carnegie and Austin Carson, “The Spotlight’s Harsh Glare: Rethinking Publicity and International Order,” International Organization 72, no. 3 (2018): 627–657.

state capacity

• Avidit Acharya and Alexander Lee, “Economic Foundations of the Territorial State System,” American Journal of Political Science 62, no. 4 (2018): 954–966.

China

• Jessica Chen Weiss and Jeremy L. Wallace, “Domestic Politics, China’s Rise, and the Future of the Liberal International Order,” International Organization 75, no. 2 (2021): 635–664.

Miscellaneous

• Patrick J. McDonald, “Great Powers, Hierarchy, and Endogenous Regimes: Rethinking the Domestic Causes of Peace,” International Organization 69, no. 3 (2015): 557–588.

• Charles Tilly, “Models and Realities of Popular Collective Action,” Social Research (1985): 717–747.

• Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson, and Rafael J. Santos, “The Monopoly of Violence: Evidence from Colombia,” Journal of the European Economic Association 11, no. S1 (2013): 5–44.

• Virginia Page Fortna, “Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature,” Annual Review of Political Science 11 (2008a): 283–301.

• Patrick Francois, Ilia Rainer, and Francesco Trebbi, “How Is Power Shared in Africa?” Econometrica 83, no. 2 (2015): 465–503.

• Jesse Driscoll, Warlords and Coalition Politics in Post-Soviet States (Cambridge University Press, 2015)., Chapters 1 and 6

• Allison Carnegie and Nikolay Marinov, “Foreign Aid, Human Rights, and Democracy Promotion: Evidence from a Natural Experiment,” American Journal of Political Science 61, no. 3 (2017): 671–683.

• David A. Lake, “Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations,” International Organization 50, no. 1 (1996): 1–33.

• Danielle F Jung and David A Lake, “Markets, Hierarchies, and Networks: An Agent-Based Organizational Ecology,” American Journal of Political Science 55, no. 4 (2011): 972–990.

• Janice Bially Mattern and Ayşe Zarakol, “Hierarchies in World Politics,” International Organization 70, no. 3 (2016): 623–654.

• Gerard Padró i Miquel, “The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: The Politics of Fear,” The Review of Economic Studies 74, no. 4 (2007): 1259–1274.

Power, deterrence, reputation

• Brett Ashley Leeds, “Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes,” American Journal of Political Science 47, no. 3 (2003): 427–439.
• Mark J. C. Crescenzi, “Reputation and Interstate Conflict,” American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 2 (2007): 382–396.
• Allan Dafoe and Devin Caughey, “Honor and War: Southern US Presidents and the Effects of Concern for Reputation,” World Politics 68, no. 2 (2016): 341–381.
• Jonathan Renshon, Allan Dafoe, and Paul Huth, “Leader Influence and Reputation Formation in World Politics,” American Journal of Political Science 62, no. 2 (2018): 325–339.

Repression and protest

• Emily Ritter and Courtenay Conrad, “Preventing and Responding to Dissent: The Observational Challenges of Explaining Strategic Repression,” American Political Science Review (Forthcoming).
• Olga V. Chyzh and Elena Labzina, “Bankrolling Repression? Modeling Third-Party Influence on Protests and Repression,” American Journal of Political Science 62, no. 2 (2018): 312–324.

Terrorism

• Ethan Bueno De Mesquita, “Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence,” International Organization 59, no. 1 (2005): 145–176.
• Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Eric S. Dickson, “The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization,” American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 2 (2007): 364–381.
• Ethan B. Bueno de Mesquita, “The Quality of Terror,” American Journal of Political Science 49, no. 3 (2005): 515–530.
• Jacob N Shapiro and David A. Siegel, “Moral Hazard, Discipline, and the Management of Terrorist Organizations,” World Politics 64, no. 1 (2012): 39–78.
• Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Jihadi Rebels in Civil War,” Dædalus 147, no. 1 (2018): 36–47.
• Efraim Benmelech, Claude Berrebi, and Esteban F. Klor, “The Economic Cost of Harboring Terrorism,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 54, no. 2 (2010): 331–353.
• E. Berman and D. D. Laitin, “Religion, Terrorism and Public Goods: Testing the Club Model,” Journal of Public Economics 92, no. 10–11 (2008): 1942–1967.
• S. Brock Blomberg, Rozlyn C. Engel, and Reid Sawyer, “On the Duration and Sustainability of Transnational Terrorist Organizations,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 54, no. 2 (2009): 303–330.

Resources

Data ideas

Here’s a (non-exhaustive) list of datasets you might consider:

• The COW datasets
• LEAD (leader characteristics dataset)
• POLITY IV
• UCDP GED
• Minorities at Risk project
• ACLED
• Social Conflict Analysis database
• Global Terrorism Database
• Political Instability Task Force
• ICEWS
• Quality of Governance data
• Varieties of Democracy (VDEM)
• Transparency International
• AID Data (William & Mary)
• Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns
• Change in Source of Leader Support (CHISOLS) Data
• The Varieties of Coups D’état: Introducing the Colpus Dataset
• Electoral intervention dataset 1946–2000
• Bread before guns or butter: Introducing Surplus Domestic Product (SDP)
• Yes, Human Rights Practices Are Improving Over Time
• Introducing the Military Intervention Project: A New Dataset on US Military Interventions, 1776–2019
• DCAD dataset
• Conflict Events Worldwide Since 1468BC: Introducing the Historical Conflict Event Dataset
• frozen conflicts in world conflict dataset
• UN Fatalities dataset
• Partisan electoral interventions by the great powers: Introducing the PEIG Dataset
• near crises in world politics
• Post-Cold War sanctioning by the EU, the UN, and the US: Introducing the EUSANCT Dataset
• Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the TIES dataset
• Financial contributions to United Nations peacekeeping, 1990–2010: A new dataset
• The Autocratic Ruling Parties Dataset: Origins, Durability, and Death

Final research design rubric

6 pages MAX, double-spaced.

1. Introduction (1 pages)
   1. Motivate why we should care about the question you want to answer (e.g., because of its real-world impact, as a gap in the literature)
   2. BRIEFLY preview what the project will do (I will argue that X) and how it will do it (I will collect XYZ data)
2. Literature review (2 pages)
   1. Briefly describe what we already know about your topic
   2. Highlight what is unknown or what gap your project will fill
3. Theory + hypotheses (3 pages)
   1. Big note: theory != literature review
   2. Need an argument about a causal process
   3. Think about who the actors are in your story, what they want, and how their interactions produce different outcomes

Reviewing a paper

(Copied this from Macartan Humphreys’ website which seems to be down)

For a formal review or referee report you have space to go into much more depth. A standard approach is to divide these reviews into three parts.

The first part can be a single paragraph — it summarizes the key contribution of the paper as you see it, gives an overall assessment, and points to the key issues, concerns, or strengths. Don’t forget the strengths. Try to articulate succinctly what you know now that you didn’t know before you read the piece. Often a quick summary can draw attention to strong features you were not conscious of, or makes you realize that what you were impressed by is not so impressive after all.

The second part discusses 3 – 6 major features of the paper; the checklist below lists features that could be useful to think through when selecting themes. Try to organize by theme (measurement, explanation etc.). The third part is for “smaller issues” where you can bullet point things from ambiguities, to estimation issues, to pointers to other work.

Other things:

• It’s useful to authors when you can point to literature they have not read, if relevant.
• It’s useful to authors to know what to cut: reviews tend to worry about length but still ask for more.
• Your tone should be such that you would not feel embarrassed if someday your review gets into the public domain by mistake.
• You should feel free to ask for extra material such as replication data or analysis plans. Sometimes reviewing can go quicker if you can access data.
• Don’t ask the authors to ask and answer a different question; respond to the paper you have been sent.
• Be generous: share references if they are missing but don’t assume that researchers intentionally ignored the work of others (or your work!); raise ethical issues if you see them but don’t assume researchers acted without ethical concern; ask for multiple comparisons corrections but don’t assume deliberately misleading reporting.
• Pronouns. For anonymous review it’s usually safe to use pronouns “you” or “they” even if single authorship has been indicated.

The Checklist

Here is my list of what to look out for as I read a paper:

Theory

• Is the theory internally consistent?
• Is it consistent with past literature and findings?
• Is it novel or surprising?
• Are elements that are excluded or simplified plausibly unimportant for the outcomes?
• Is the theory general or specific? Are there more general theories on which this theory - could draw or contribute?

From Theory to Hypotheses

• Is the theory really needed to generate the hypotheses?
• Does the theory generate more hypotheses than considered?
• Are the hypotheses really implied by the theory? Or are there ambiguities arising from say - non-monotonicities or multiple equilibria?
• Does the theory specify mechanisms?
• Does the theory suggest heterogeneous effects?

Hypotheses

• Are the hypotheses complex? (eg in fact 2 or 3 hypotheses bundled together)
• Are the hypotheses falsifiable?

Evidence I: Design

• External validity: is the population examined representative of the larger population of - interest?
• External validity: Are the conditions under which they are examined consistent with the - conditions of interest?
• Measure validity: Do the measures capture the objects specified by the theory?
• Consistency: Is the empirical model used consistent with the theory?
• Mechanisms: Are mechanisms tested? How are they identified?
• Replicability: Has the study been done in a way that it can be replicated?
• Interpretation: Do the results admit rival interpretations?

Evidence II: Analysis and Testing

• Identification: are there concerns with reverse causality?
• Identification: are there concerns of omitted variable bias?
• Identification: does the model control for pre treatment variables only? Does it control or - does it match?
• Identification: Are poorly identified claims flagged as such?
• Robustness: Are results robust to changes in the model, to subsetting the data, to changing - the period of measurement or of analysis, to the addition or exclusion of plausible - controls?
• Standard errors: does the calculation of test statistics make use of the design? Do standard - errors take account of plausibly clustering structures/differences in levels?
• Presentation: Are the results presented in an intelligible way? Eg using fitted values or - graphs? How can this be improved?
• Interpretation: Can no evidence of effect be interpreted as evidence of only weak effects?

Evidence III: Other sources of bias

• Fishing: were hypotheses generated prior to testing? Was any training data separated from test data?
• Measurement error: is error from sampling, case selection, or missing data plausibly - correlated with outcomes?
• Spillovers / Contamination: Is it plausible that outcomes in control units were altered - because of the treatment received by the treated?
• Compliance: Did the treated really get treatment? Did the controls really not?
• Hawthorne effects: Are subjects modifying behavior simply because they know they are under study?
• Measurement: Is treatment the only systematic difference between treatment and control or are there differences in how items were measured?
• Implications of Bias: Are any sources of bias likely to work for or against the hypothesis tested?

Explanation

• Does the evidence support the particular causal account given?
• Are mechanisms examined? Can they be?
• Are there observable implications we might expect to see associated with different possible mechanisms?

Policy Implications

• Do the policy implications really follow from the results?
• If implemented would the policy changes have effects other thank those specified by the research?
• Have the policy claims been tested directly?
• Is the author overselling or underselling the findings?